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ABSTRACT 
I model the technical innovation of a final goo d  as a p rocess of incremental 
enhancement due to Research and Development (R&D) efforts undertaken on 
subcomponents to the final good. R&D contracting is analyzed within various 
principal I agent structures. I identify a principal who jointly values the performance 
capabilities of the subcomponent undergoing R&D and the funds available for other 
subcomponents; thus, he does not have a transferable utility function. I justify and 
characterize a performance seeking agent in addition to the conventional profit 
seeking agent. The information environment and the motivational properties of the 
principal and agent significantly affect the form and existence of optimal R&D 
contracts. I draw insights for private and public sector industrial organization. 
SUBCOMPONENT INNOVATION AND MORAL HAZARD: 
WHERE TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS MEE1S THE DIVISION OF LABOR 
Charles W. Polk* 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental effect of technological progress on production is obvious and well 
accepted. It is also dear that, in a world of complex final goods, technological progress proceeds 
at the subcomponent level, with innovations incrementally incorporated into final goods. 
Innovation is fraught with greater uncertainties than established production; thus, the agency 
concerns that influence industrial organization and optimal contracting are surely relevant. The 
optimal production organization for the technological evolution of a final good must therefore be 
fundamentally affected by the relationship between subcomponent innovator and final good 
producer. However, contractual arrangements for subcomponent innovation, hereafter referred 
to as Research and Development (R&D), are not adequately addressed by either the existing 
Industrial Organization or Optimal Contacting literatures, leaving this critical intersection 
between the division of labor and technological progress under-addressed.1 
By expressly considering the subcomponent nature of production while emphasizing the 
goals of the final good producer and the goals of subcomponent innovators I obtain a useful and 
significant characterization of optimal R&D production organization. I begin by classifying the 
contractual forms observed for subcomponent R&D procurements, then I characterize the 
*This paper is based on the author's Ph.D. thesis, "The Organization of Production: Moral Hazard and 
R&D," Caltech, May 1993. The author acknowledges the financial support of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's 
Flight Projects Office and Director's Discretionary 11und along with tfie Program on Organization Design 
within the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences at Caltech. The responsibility for all errors and 
inconsistencies is borne solely by the author. 
lcoase's observation (1937) that production is vertically integrated to the degree that the marginal cost 
of so doing is below that of market contracting provides a unifying paradigm for production organization 
yet so borders on tautology that little can be specifically explained. Alchain's and Demsetz' corollary (1972) 
that production is vertically integrated until the cost of management forces the marginal cost of internal 
production to exceed that of market procurement adds little except to suggest that efficiency within a firm is 
degr when subordinates can conceal inputs to production, thus extracting a rent from management. 
Williamson (1979) expands on Alchain's, Crawford's, and Klein's observation (1978) of the significance of
bilateral monopoly in complex subcomponent production by illustrating the effects of moral hazard in both 
internally organized and market contracted production. Past analytical research has concentrated on 
principal/ agent models of single component production with no work expressly considering the effects of 
subcomponent production. 
subcomponent nature of the final product, the interests of various principals, and the interests of 
the potential agents. I proceed through a structured, analytical modeling of the types of R&D 
production organization observed to identify general optimal contracting arrangements. A 
primary goal of this research is to provide practical insight into how R&D should be organized; 
therefore, I conclude the paper with a procurement policy section. 
2.0 OBSERVED APPROACHES TO R&D PROCUREMENT 
The pre-R&D existence of a final good composed of numerous subcomponents implies that a 
decision to innovate one subcomponent will result in its post-R&D incorporation only if the 
outcome of the R&D results in superior performance to the existing subcomponent. Further, to 
warrant an R&D investment, a range of performance outcomes weighted significantly above the 
status quo must be expected. Therefore, it is reasonable that R&D subcomponent procurement 
contracts may be variable in both price and performance. The acceptability of a range of 
performance outcomes is an important characteristic distinguishing subcomponent R&D from 
standard procurement. Within this variable performance structure, the following three general 
contract forms encompass the organizational approaches observed between the final good 
producing principal and the subcomponent R&D agent:2 
Pure Fixed Price [PFP] -- The agent receives a set payment regardless of the R&D 
performance outcome 
Fixed Price Performance Based [FPPB] -- Based on the performance outcome of R&D, 
the agent receives a payment agreed upon prior to his commencing R&D. 
Cost Exposure Sharing [CES] - Based on interim progress, the agent receives payment 
relative to a price/performance relationship specified prior to his commencing R&D. 
This provides the principal with information to more efficiently configure the other 
subcomponents to the final good while providing the agent with cost risk insurance. 
The timing of payments under any of these contract forms will vary with the agency 
structure and the public or private sector affiliation of the principal: e.g., progress payments from 
the principal will be required for both internal agency and U.S. federal government 
procurement;3 whereas, payment timing and contingent rebates (warranties) may be negotiated 
between a private principal and a private external agent. However, given ex ante complete 
2 All contracts considered in this research are ex ante con;i.plete. A discussion of the relevance of
incomplete contracts that require interim or ex post renegotiation is included in Appendix A. More complete 
and applied descriptions of R&D contracts observed in practice are included in section 5 where the results of 
the following analysis will be brought to bear on observed industrial organization. 
3oue to the Anti-Deficiency Act, a federal agency acting as the principal in a procurement must provide
progress payments sufficient to allow for contract termination at the government's discretion without 
subsequent financial liability to the federal government. 
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contracts, payment timing is an accounting issue rather than a substantive one. The substantive 
issues for R&D subcomponent procurement are agency concerns, particularly moral hazard. 
Through analyses of principal/ agent structures varying in information makeup and participant 
motivations I characterize optimality among these three general contract forms. 
3.0 R&D PROCUREMENT FROM A PROFIT SEEKING AGENT 
My analysis models R&D as a two step process, influenced by a correlation between the 
probabilistic nature of innovation and the interests of the involved parties. In section 3, I examine 
R&D production within the context of conventional profit seeking agency: I introduce the basic 
R&D production process removed from agency complications (subsection 3.1). To ground my 
analysis in the existing literature, I characterize optimal R&D contracting between a principal 
contracting for a complete good from a profit seeking agent (subsection 3.3). I make my first 
significant adaptation to conventional principal I agent analysis by attempting to characterize an 
optimal contract between these same parties but regarding a subcomponent to final production 
rather than the complete good (subsection 3.4) . Profit seeking agency is then rounded out by 
introducing the wholly reasonable prospect of interim adverse selection (subsection 3.5). Doubt 
is cast on the existence of optimal R&D contracting arrangements that allow the principal to 
benefit from mid-production information about the outcome of the agent's Research effort. This 
doubt motivates the analysis of section 4 involving an agent who is at least partially motivated by 
the performance outcome of the subcomponent that he is contracted to innovate. 
3.1 R&D Production without Agency Concerns [analysis of the first best] 
Research involves an effort to enhance the technological inputs to a subcomponent while 
Development incorporates the technological outcome of Research into actual subcomponent 
production. R&D has been modeled as an iterative process, where Research efforts are expended 
until an acceptable prototype of a final good results, which is then Developed.4 Alternatively, a
single Research endeavor may be undertaken with the intent of innovating a subcomponent to a 
many component final good. By this alternate model, the innovation will be Developed into the 
necessary subcomponent if it will result in value superior to available Off-the-Slielf substitutes. 
The latter process does not preclude further R&D on the same subcomponent or any other, it 
simply reflects the incremental technological evolution of a complex production process. As we 
wish to model subcomponent production, we adopt the more incremental definition of R&D. 
4 Guofu Tan, "Incentive Procurement Contracts with Costly R&D," Caltech Social Science Working Paper
702, June 1989. 
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Figure 3.1 provides a four period model of R&D production without agency concerns. Each 
period represents an outcome, with the paths between periods representing decisions that affect 
the next outcome. Under the assumption that the principal is cognizant of the nature of the 
whole process it is appropriate to describe Figure 3.1 from the period 3 outcome backward: 
The period 3 outcome is a subcomponent with performance 
capability S, where S depends on the outcome of Research, T, 
and Development funding, t. Production of the final good 
proceeds after period 3, where S is combined with other 
subcomponents purchased using residual funds, II = B - 'A - t
[B arbitrary]. The principal values production of S relative to 
all of the subcomponents comprising the final good; therefore, 
the principal's utility function is modeled as U[S(T, t), II].
The period '.?. mtcome is the technology, T, developed from 
the Research process. T depends positively on the principal's 
Research investment decision, 'A, and a probabilistic element, 
8, drawn from a publicly known distribution F(8) with 
density f(8) [i.e., T = T('A, 8)]. The minimum T is fixed by the
pre-Research, Off-the-Shelf, level of technology and denoted as 
T0. Upon observing T, the principal decides what level of 
Development funding, t(T), to invest in the production of S. 
Decision Maker 
o-
Nature Principal 
.. 
Research :X ' 
Investment ... / 
/ 
1-;- � Probabalistic 
"O '0 , Effect 
0 ·i:: ' 
� Technology ' 2 � Outcome T '. 
Development 
Expense t' 
3 ..:.. Subcomponet S�Outcome 
Figure 3.1. Subcomponent 
R&D Production w/o Agency 
The period 1 outcome is that a Research effort funded by an investment 'A is underway.
Nature makes the probabilistic decision 8 that will affect the Research process. 
The period 0 outcome is that the principal has concluded that the subcomponent, S, 
should undergo R&D. The principal decides on a Research investment of 'A > o.s
Fundamental Management Postulate: The decision to modify final good production by 
innovating subcomponent S is made with the expectation of increased value to the principal. 
Implications: In the absence of agency concerns, the R&D decision is governed by the available 
technological possibilities for all subcomponents, the principal's budget, and the principal's 
valuations. In the presence of agency concerns, innovating S becomes a management decision 
over a technical process that will be manipulated by an agent; implying that innovation of S is ex 
ante warranted given compensatory rents for moral hazard and adverse selection. All of the 
following analyses thus concentrate on whether or not the solutions proposed by first order 
optimization techniques satisfy the technological and agency requirements for 'A* > O; assuming
that, in expectation, the principal is better off for having made the management decision to 
commence R&D of S. 
SThe following functional characteristics specify the nature of this R&D process:
Outcome of Research is technology= T(A, 8) 
T(A, 8) is concave Ti> 0, Tii < 0, T(O, 8) =To [Off-the-Shelf] for all 8, T(A, 8) �To for all A� 0 [revert
to To if 8 outcome is 'bad'], T(A, 8) � Tmax for all .A> 0 [support of f(8) is independent of A] 
Outcome of Development is the subcomponent S(T, t(T)), 
S is concave[Si > 0, Sii < O], and Srt > 0, t(T) is Development funding, S(T, 0) = 0 for all r. 
Prindpal's Utility= U{S, II), U is concave in both arguments [Ui > 0, Uii < O] 
S represents a subcomponent undergoing R&D, II is funding for Off-the-Shelf sub-components 
The budget for production of the final good is B [arbitrary for our purposes]
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Solving backwards -- Second Period Production Funding, t[T(A.,6)]: 
£2 = u( s( T, t ), B - A. - t) + yt y = 0 if t > 0, y > 0 if t = 0 
� ( + ) dt : Si:Us - Urr + y = 0 v f\ I e 
The solution t * to (3.2) will be a maximum if
Note that given the concavity of U and S, (3.3) is less than zero if Usn <::: 0. U8n ;;::: 0 is a
mathematical representation of the positively and jointly valued nature of the various 
subcomponents in final good production; namely, the marginal value of increasing the capability 
of one subcomponE•nt is increasing in the capability of all other subcomponents. Henceforth, this 
property will be referred to as balance, in the sense that the principal wishes to balance the 
constituent worth of the subcomponents as inputs to the final good. 
Assumption 3.1: U8n <::: 0 [the principal values balance].
Some comparative statics for the Development funding decision, t*, illuminate the R&D
process and the effect of the Research outcome, T(ll., 8), on the optimal funding decision: 
3.1 
3.2 
d( 
de 
= -T8(S
Tl:U5 + STStU55 - STU�) - Ye(A,  8) 
SttUs + s;Uss - 2StUsrr + U= 
= 3.4 
-T,_(STl:US + S TStUss - STUSrr) + stuSrr - u1\"1\" - y ,_( A, 8) 
5i:t Us + s;Uss - 25i:Usrr + U=
3.5 
3.6 
3.7 
Note that for any level of Research funding, A., Development funding, t, may be decreasing in 
relation to the outcome of the Research, T(ll., 8). Figure 3.2 illustrates the principal's utility space 
relative to Development funding. A potential t*(T) funding schedule is shown that is increasing
and decreasing in T. Development funding that decreases with the positive outcome of a learning 
phase is intuitively reasonable for a subcomponent to a final good, the value of which depends on 
the performance contributions of multiple subcomponents. This is implicit in the assumption 
that U is concave and has a non-negative cross product between S and II
5 
U=U[S(T0,t(T0)), B-A.-t(r0)] 
I 
S{T 
S(r) 
I 
Range of Technological -
Possibilities 
!:: 
Cll El ..... 
0.. o1i ..9 i::: 
Cll " .... >]� -2
T� 0------=r=-=-T-max 
Level of subcoinpo­
- nent technol ogy, T 
/,.* - - - I 
B 
Funds remaining for other subcomponents, I1
Figure 3.2. Principal's Utility Space with Sample Indifference 
Curves, Technological Possibilities , R&D Funding 
Next solve for tire Research funding decision, "A, at Period 0: 
£0 = f u[s(r(A. , 8), t*(A., e)), B -"A - ((A., 8)f(8)d8 3.8 
d
d
� : f [us[rr.ST +t;st] - u7T[ 1+t; ] )f (e)de = f [rr.STUs-U7T+t;[stUs-U7TJ!(e)de � o 3.9
From (3.2): StU s - U7T = /(A., 8) 'if 8
dd:) : f [Tr.STUS - u7T - y*(A., e)t; jf(e)de � 0
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: y .. (A., 8 )t; = 0; therefore
From (3.11) we determine the second derivative of (3.8) with respect to "A 
d:
A
�a = f [Tr.t.STUs + T�STIUS + (Tt.STtUss- Tr.5TUS7T + U1T7T ]f{8)d8 � 0
Theorem 3.1: The solution ("A*, t*) to the R&D production model without agency concerns is the 
unique optimum. 
Proof: Immediate from the second order conditions (3.3) & (3.12), and the linearity of the 
constraint in (3.1). QED
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3.10 
3.11
3.12
In the absence of agency concerns, R&D subcomponent production organization is a straight 
forward multi-period dynamic programming process with decisions contingent on an observable 
Research outcome. The implicit value from balancing the performance contributed from the R&D 
subcomponent with the performance obtainable from other purchased subcomponents results in 
the explicit fact that Development funding may be negatively related to the success of Research. 
3.2 Profit Seeking Agency within the R&D Production Structure 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the inclusion of a profit seeking agent in the R&D subcomponent 
production process. Research funding, "A, is chosen by the agent relative to the common 
knowledge probabilistic quality of Research (i.e., the random variable 8 with density f(8) ). The 
outcome of Research, T, is assumed to be common knowledge; however, the inputs to Research, "A
and 8, are observed by the agent only. Upon observing T, the agent chooses Development 
funding, p(r). The production tradeoffs for S between T and p are assumed to be common 
knowledge; thus, the observation of T by the principal implies the observation of p, and visa­
versa. Upon delivery of S, the agent receives a payment based on a contract t(r). The principal 
values the qualities of the good S and funds, II. The agent values simple profit; however, he may 
have limited access to agent-specific Research assets such that committing "A-worth of these assets 
represents an opportunity cost beyond transferable monetary expense. The function tp(A.) is 
included in the agent's utility function, V, to account for this opportunity cost. 
The R&D contract, t, in Figure 3.3 may D . . M k ens10n a er
depend on an observation of the Research 
outcome, T, in a manner affecting purchase price, 
performance capability and agency profit. 
Referring back to section 2, this role of an interim 
outcome is in accordance with a Cost Exposure 
Sharing (CES) contract. Given the ex ante general 
contracting structure, the interim production 
report of T establishes the performance I price 
tradeoff point to be purchased by the principal and 
the division of Research-related financial risk 
borne by principal and agent. In this research, I 
will not determine the precise form of any optimal 
CES contract; rather, my analyses will be based on 
7 
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Figure 3.3. Subcomponent R&D Production 
with a Profit Seeking Agent 
characterizing optimal incentive compatible direct revelation (ICDR) contracts. The Revelation 
Principle assures the existence of an optimal real-world analog to an optimal ICDR contract.6 By 
characterizing the optimal ICDR contracts for R&D production processes, I will draw insights 
into optimal real-world contracting. 
A one-stage production process captured by periods 0, 1, 2, and 4 of Figure 3.3, and 
simplified with a profit motivated principal contracting for a complete and marketable good S 
[e .g.; U = U(S - $)], is essentially the simple moral hazard process studied by Ross [1973],
Holmstrom [1979], and others. These authors have relied on the Revelation Principle to validate 
ICDR approaches that employ analysis of first order optimization conditions. Although the 
functional forms chosen and the questions of interest have varied, each of these authors have 
been able to characterize the optimal contract as positively monotonic in the outcome of the 
complete good that the agent was contracted to produce. Positive monotonicity is intuitively 
reasonable as both principal and agent can be unambiguously made better off by increasing 
output in models with transferable utility. 
The two-stage, production process shown in Figure 3.3, but simplified with U = U[S - t], is 
markedly similar to the R&D model of Guofu Tan Uune 1989].7 Tan models both single and 
multiple agent cases. His single agent case is the one of interest here. His model's fundamental 
difference from mine is that the outcome of Research, T, along with the inputs to research, "A & 0, 
are not observable, only the final output, S, is observable. Thus, the root moral hazard problem is
augmented by an interim adverse selection problem. The two models diverge further in the 
functional restrictions that Tan imposes: agent and principal are risk neutral, U is linearly 
separable in S and II, and V is linearly separable in t and "A. All the same, the significance of
information asymmetries in R&D procurement is highlighted in Tan's work and he is able to 
show results similar in spirit to the body of the more standard research. In this and the following 
subsection, I present a version of R&D procurement without the interim adverse selection 
problem, but with a principal and agent that may be risk averse. In subsection 3.5, I examine the 
interim adverse selection effect of an unobservable Research outcome. 
3.3 R&D Procurement of a Final Good from a Profit Seeking Agent 
To provide a baseline for the novelty of my work, it is appropriate that I employ my 
nomenclature and production phasing to characterize the type of optimal R&D contracting 
examined in the traditional literature; i.e., a contract with a profit seeking agent for a complete 
6For a basic treatment of the Revelation Principle see, Roger B. Myerson, "Incentive Compatibility and
the Bargaining Problem; Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 1, Jan. 1979, pages 61-73. The terminology and use of the 
Rev. Prin. employed in this research can be more directly referenced in, Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, 
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," journal of Economic Theory, vol. '29, 1983, pages 267-268. 
7Tan's production environment is similar, including an equivalent definition of Off-the-Shelf tech., r0. 
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good that is directly valued by the principal. Referring to Figure 3.3, p(T) is a monitorable 
development expenditure made by the agent which, when combined with the outcome of 
Research, T, yields S(T, p). Gross compensation to the agent is t and net compensation is (t - p). If 
the principal is procuring S as a final, complete good, then the following specify the traditional 
R&D contracting problem in the context of the basic process introduced in subsection 3.1: 
(i) Suppress e by viewing T as a random variable with distribution F(T, A) and finite 
support [T 0, T ]. Given a distribution of e, F(T, /\) is the distribution induced on T 
via the relationship T = T(A , 6). Assume that F is convex in A; i.e., F1-. < 0, F1-.1-.> 0.
(ii) s = s( T ,  p(T)) , S i > 0, sii � 0 ,  and STf' � 0 
(iii) v = v(t(T ) - p( T )) - ip(A) , u = u[s - t( T )j , u', v'&ip'>O, U" & v" �O, ip" ;?::0
Agent's Problem: 
MaximizeVw. r.t. Research cost: ! � [v(t-p)- ip(/\ )]fd T} = 0 = f vf;1.dT-ip' = 0 3.13 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
Participation Constr<int Iru:entive Compatibility Constraint 
Necessary Condition for an optimal A 
-5 
Integrating by parts yields 
UF;1.1: - tF;1.U' [l - t' ]dT + µ[v F;1.;1. 1:- tF;1.;1.t'v'dT + ip"] = -5
The nature of the distribution function, F(6, A), allows for two useful simplifications: 
Therefore, (3.16) can be rewritten as 
Necessary Condition for an optimal t(T)  
dJ U' 
dt 
: - U'f + yv'f + µv'f" = O <:fT => 
v
' 
Necessary Condition for an optimal p(T) 
9 
. f y + µt VT
-5 
3.14 
3.15 
3.16 
3.17 
3.18 
dJ = Sp U' = y + µ .!i... VT
dp v' f 
Comparing (3.18) with (3.19) yields 
Differentiating each side of (3.20) with respect to T yields 
s 
S-rp + p'Sw = 0 VT => p' = -� � 0 VT
pp 
Differentiating each side of (3.18) w.r.t T and substituting for p' using (3.21) yields 
[ ( )] ( ) = µv/2-d ( f, ) v' U" S-r + p'Sp - t' - v" t' - p' U' dT f 
Substituting in (3.20) and rearranging yields 
v'S U" - µv'2 d/ (f,/) 
1 I 'r 7d'r 7f vt = p + 'U" "U' T v + v 
Assumption 3.2: :
T 
( �) � 0 [Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property, Standard ] 
Given the concavity of U and v, p" > 0 from (3.21), Assumption 3.2, andµ > 0 [due to Holmstrom, 
1979], equation (3.23) directly leads to the critical inequality for net compensation (t -p): 
( t' - p' ) � 0 VT
Such a contract corresponds to a CES contract where the agent's profit is positively monotonic in 
his Research outcome, the agent is exposed to greater cost risk for less successful Research 
outcomes, and the final performance and price of the produced item are not specified until after 
the Research outcome is known. 
From (3.17), a sufficient condition for the agent's maximization problem is that the transfer 
be positively monotonic; thus, the candidate optimal solutions solve the agent's problem. 
Similarly, from (3.17) and (3.20), a sufficient (yet overly strong) condition for an interior 
maximization to the principal's problem is: 
3 .19 
3.20 
3.21 
3.22 
3.23 
3.24 
(3.23) v" [%-r(fx)l 
t' - p' < Sr = - - > µv' VT 3.25 - v' - S-rU' 
Condition (3.25) may be thought of as a mathematical representation of the Fundamental 
Management Postulate (FMP) for the complete good R&D case of Figure 3.3.
Theorem 3.2: The candidate ICDR solution [A.*, t*(T), p*(T)] to final good R&D production derived
from the first order conditions [(3.15), (3.18) , and (3.19)] is the unique optimum. 
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Proof: t' -p' � 0 implies that the constraints on (3.14) are convex in "A. FMP (3.25) implies that the
maximand of (3.14) is concave in "A. The LeGendre conditions are trivially satisfied for (3.14) as 
dJ I dt' and dJ /dp' = 0 for all T .  QED
Theorem 3.2 shows that R&D production of the complete, marketable item adds 
computational but not substantive complexity to the standard optimal contracting outcomes. 
3.4 R&D Procurement of a Subcomponent from a Profit Seeking Agent 
In this subsection I analyze subcomponent production for the general model illustrated in 
Figure 3.3. The nomenclature used is the same as in subsection 3.3 except that subcomponent 
production rather than complete production is modeled; namely, U = U[S(T, p(T)), II]. 
Agent's Problem [same as (3.13) is subsection 3.3]: 
MaxirnizeVw. r.t .  Research cost: ! � [v(t-p) - tp ("A )jfdT} = 0 = f vf1,dT - tp' 0 
Principal's Agency Constrained Problem: 
J = f u[s(T, p(T)), rr ] fdT + vf [v - tpj fdT + µ[f vfAd• - tp' J + 5"A
ParticipationConstraint Incentive Compatibility Ccmstraint 
The necessary condition for an optimum in "A: 
:�: f u[s(., p(•)), rr ]fAdT + µ[f vfAAdT - tp" J = -5
Integrating by parts (3.27) becomes 
The necessary conditions for optimal R&D price and Development cost functions are: 
dJ 
= 
dt 
dJ = 
dp 
� f = y + µ::.J:... VT 
v' f 
Sp Us f = y + µ::.J:... VT
v' f 
Combining (3.29) and (3.30) yields 
u S p = U 'II T {vs Sp = 1 in subsection 3.3 } s 
Differentiating (3.31) with respect to T yields 
STJ>U5 + S,SPU55 - S,USrr + t'(Umr - SpUsrr )p' = V T5r USrr - SppUs - S�Uss
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3.26 
3.27 
3.28 
3.29 
3.30 
3.31 
3.32 
Differentiating (3.29) with respect to T yields 
Rearranging (3.33), we get 
p ' [v'5rU91 + v"Urr ) - t'[v'Urrrr + v''Urr) µv'2 :
T
(1-) - v'STUsrr
(3.32) and (3.34) can be placed in matrix form as 
� �1�:1 = �I where
B = 
[urrrr - spuSrr l 
� 0 I E = 
STpUS + STSpUss - STUSrr 
- [spUsrr - SppUs - S�Uss) [spUsrr - �Us - S:Uss) 
Recalling that net compensation (t - p) is the critical contractual concern, applications of Cramer's 
Rule and rearrangement yield 
t'-p' = 
µv'2 %T(f}()o -v'[sp ST(spu 9T -SppUs )+s1Pu s(spuSrr - urrrr)] 
�������=--���������������� VT 
v'[Urrrr(SppUs + S:Uss) - S:u� ] - v"O
In subsection 3.3, positive monotonicity of the R&D contract (3.24) was a sufficient condition 
for maximization of the agent's concerns, which combined with the Fundamental Management 
Postulate (FMP) allowed Theorem 3.2 to be proven. The effect of subcomponent production 
prevents (3.35) from being signed a-priori.8 The FMP may be invoked here to assure that some 
sufficient condition for the principal's concerns holds [e.g., ( t' - p' ) � ST Us /Urr VT from (3.28)
and (3.31)]; however, the agent's concerns [e.g., (t' - p' ) � 0 VT ] need not be fulfilled by (3.35).
The lack of certain monotonicity in (3.35) is important and intuitive -- an R&D contract where 
agent compensation decreases over some range of possible Research outcomes allows the 
principal to shift expenditures to other subcomponents. Thus, the agent's desire for a contract 
increasing in the Research outcome may not be reconcilable with the principal's intent to 'balance' 
the subcomponent inputs to overall production. In such an eventuality, /...* = 0, and no R&D effort
on subcomponent S would be undertaken.
8This is true even if one assumes risk neutrality for both principal and agent.
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3.33 
3.34 
3.35 
3.5 The Relevance of an Observable Research Outcome 
Assume the outcome of interim production, T, is not observable by the principal. After 
Research is concluded, the agent states an outcome, i = T -c; the principal provides t( i ); and the 
agent produces S(T, p '"). The extent of understatement (i:: > 0) is bound by the principal's ability to 
enforce the outcome of subcomponent production - actual production must equal that claimed; 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3.36), we know that there exists an optimal 
Development funding decision by the agent, p*(i::), and that 
p '
* 
= 
S, + p'Sp 
SP 
We can now characterize misrepresentation when T is not observable to the principal: 
£ =v[t(r-i::)-p " (•- i::)j-w(t..)+ PE 
* Substituting in the expression for p' from (3.37) and rearranging: 
t' - p' = � + ...e.. S v' p 
Note that if p > 0, theni:: = 0, i = T, and the lack of an observable is irrelevant. The condition on
(t' - p') for this follows directly from (3.38) 
t'- p' > �
SP 
Theorem 3.3: Whether contracting for an R&D effort of the complete final good [subsection 3.3] 
or for a subcomponent [subsection 3.4], no interior optimal ICDR contract (i.e., a contract that 
includes R&D, t.. * > 0) based on a stated but unobserved Research outcome is possible. 
Proof: For Complete Production [subsection 3.3] 
An optimization condition (3.20) in subsection 3.3 is q, = 1 for all T; thus, for i = T, (3.39) becomes 
t' - p' > S, which over all T violates the necessary condition (3.17) for an optimal t... 
For Subcomponent Production [subsection 3.4] 
Posit that for some T, the agent states the truth, i = T. For this T, an optimal compensation
function [t(r) -p(T)] has the property ( t' - p ') s S{;Us ; i.e., the principal's utility is greater than 
lT 
it would have been at T - fu. Therefore, at this T, by (3.39), Sr Us > � � S > �. Were there
Urr SP P Us 
no agency concerns, the principal would determine optimum p(T) by maximizing U[S(t, p(T)), B -
p(T)] which results in the condition that Sp = �. Any Cost of Agency will cause Sp < �. This Us Us 
contradicts the assumption that the compensation function [t(T) - p(T)] was an optimal contract. 
This contradiction holds over all T. QED
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3.36 
3.37 
3.38 
3.39 
If the principal cannot observe the Research outcome, an optimum incentive compatible 
contract must be conditioned on the final production outcome. This is analogous to stating that 
in the absence of an observable Research outcome, no CES R&D contract can be optimal -- an 
optimal R&D contact with a profit seeking agent, must be of a FPPB form. An FPPB contracting 
environment can be illustrated by collapsing period 4 into period 3 of Figure 3.3 and proceeding 
with simplified analyses for complete and subcomponent production. In the case of complete 
production, the FPPB contract is the result of the standard moral hazard literature (e.g., 
Holmstrom). For subcomponent production, the principal's balancing motive again prevents 
certain monotonicity and/....*> 0 cannot be proven (see Polk, 1993, pages 35 - 40) . 
4.0 R&D PROCUREMENT FROM A PERFORMANCE SEEKING AGENT 
Several approaches to R&D production organization justify positing a type of agent who is 
motivated by the performance of the subcomponent he is contracted to innovate: 
A manager in a large firm or government research lab who is directly responsible for 
an internal R&D effort of a subcomponent to some larger task. 
A scientist agent under an external procurement such as those let for government 
funded projects or Industry /University collaborative efforts. 
Often, such agents are contracted under the condition that they not profit from the work (beyond 
an agreed salary). This condition may be acceptable if the career impact of success is substantial. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates R&D contracting to a performance seeking agent. The organization of 
production differs from that of Figure 3.3: 
This type of agent may have limited access 
to capital markets; thus, initial funds, b, may 
be provided to the agent as a Research price. 
The cost of Development, t, is transferred to 
the agent with no additional compensation; 
thus, t is also the price of Development. 
The only source of monetary compensation 
for the agent is (b - /....). 
Disutility of forgoing compensation, or of 
providing independent funding, (b- fl.)< b, is 
captured by TJ (/.... - b) in the utility function, V,
The information asymmetry is unchanged 
from section 3; the Research outcome, T, is 
observed by both principal and agent, but the 
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Figure 4.1. Subcomponent R&D Production 
with a Performance Seeking Agent 
inputs to Research, /... and 8, are observed only by the agent. The agent may choose to take 
advantage of the moral hazard inherent in the Research portion of the task by reporting a 
Research cost of /... while having actually expended /...* < /... and retaining (b - /... *) > (b - /...) for 
himself. 
The nomenclature and functional. assumptions for the performance seeking agent are very 
similar to subsection 3.4 with the exclusion of p(T) and with the necessary modifications to the 
agent's utility; V = v[S(T, t)] + TJ("A -b), where v' > 0, v" < 0, TJ' < 0, TJ" < 0. Analysis proceeds in
two sequential steps: Full Information and Incomplete Information. 
4.1 R&D Subcomponent Procurement under Full Information 
The agent's Participation Constraint: 
4.1 
Tire Principal's problem may then be formed as: 
J = f U [S (T, t(r)), B-b-t(r*(T, /...)dT + v [f [v + TJ �(T, /... )dT - KJ +�b + pA 4.2 
b,1'.,t(r) 
The first order conditions are: 
Pointwise optimization of J relative to t yields: 
Lemma 4.1: Un - StU s > 0 for all T.
Proof: Immediate from y > 0. QED
The third first order condition (4.5) can be used to obtain the first derivative of the optimal 
contract by differentiating each side relative to r. 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
t' - - 4.6 
Note that t' may be <=> 0. 
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s 
Lemma 4.2: The contract under complete information has the property t' > - -I.. V T .  
st 
Proof: see Appendix: 
� Lemma 4.3: The contract under complete information has the property t' s - V T.
stt 
Proof: see Appendix 
Theorem 4.1: If S( T, t) is separable in its arguments (i.e., Srt = 0), then the contract under complete 
information has the property that t' s 0 for all T.
Proof: Immediate from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. QED
Assumption 4.1: The optimal Development transfer, t*, has the property t' < Sr Us V T .u7r - stun 
[an overly strong analytical statement of the Fundamental Management Postulate]. 
Theorem 4.2: Given Lemma 4.2 and Assumption 4.1, the contract under complete information 
has the property that for each increase in T, both the principal and the agent are made better off. 
This property is captured by the following inequality: 
Proof: That the inequality implies both would be better off over all dr is shown 
dS s 
- = Sr + t'St :. t' > - .=.I.. = dT St 
dS 
> 0 dT 
dU 
dT > 
0 . QED 
II s 
Corollary 4.1: If the relative risk aversion condition - .!... � � +
v' SrSt 
where 0 = SttUsUn - Si:Us(StUsn - U=) + Si:Un(StUss - Usn) 
Assumption 4.1 is satisfied and Theorem 4.2 holds: 
Proof: see Appendix 
Corollary 4.2: If Uss. Umr. US7f, and v" = 0 [Tan's Assumptions], then 
i. t' = _3:.t_ VT  (� 0)
stt 
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S 0 VT , holds, then 
iii. Assumption 4.1 holds, implying that Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 hold.
Proof: see Appendix 
Corollary 4.2 provides a useful comparison to the existing R&D contracting literature when 
one adds the element of an agent motivated by the performance capability of his subcomponent. 
Under conditions of optimum risk sharing, the optimum contract has the standard properties of 
positive monotonicity in the observable and uniformly increasing utilities for principal and agent 
with each increase in the observable. These results suggest that the new type of agency 
motivation introduced here does not, in and of itself, fundamentally affect contracting. 
Comparing the agency model in section 4 to that in section 3, recall that with subcomponent 
production (subsection 3.4), optimal risk sharing under full information, µ = 0, did not necessarily 
result in both the principal and agent being better off over all levels of output.9 Further, it could
not definitely be shown in subsection 3.4 that either the full or incomplete information solution 
resulted in the principal or agent being better off in expectation. Through Theorem 4.2, Corollary 
4.1 and Corollary 4.2, I have shown conditions under which the R&D model of section 4 exhibits 
the standard qualities of optimal risk sharing under full information. By Theorem 4.3, I establish 
that both principal and agent are generally better off in expectation under full information for the 
model examined in section 4. 
Theorem 4.3: Any positive R&D result (/.. > 0) from the full information first order conditions
(4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) implies that both principal and agent are better off in expectation. 
Proof: see Appendix 
4.2 R&D Subcomponent Procurement under Incomplete Information 
In this section, the information asymmetry illustrated in Figure 4.1 and common to the 
analyses in section 3 is considered for the performance seeking agent. TI'lis asymmetry should 
result in a moral hazard agency concern as the subcomponent performance interests of the agent 
do not perfectly overlap the broader final good performance interests of the principal. 
The Agent's problem is to clwose A TO maximize: 
4.7 
9Prindpal and agent were shown to be better off over all r with complete production (subsection 3.3).
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The Agency Constrained Principal's problem: 
First Order Conditions 
:! : -J U1TfdT - YTJ' - µf]" + � =0
Integration of (4.11) by parts yields: 
Pointwise optimization of J relative to t yields: 
= -y- µfA V Tf 
Differentiating (4.13) with respect to T yields the expression for t': 
t' = -
S,Pt[v'(StU55 - U57r) -v"(StUs - U1T)) + v'S-nUrr + µ(v'St)2.£; f 
snv'(StUss - Us1T) -v"(StUs - U1T)j -v'St(StUSrr - U=) + v'SttU 1T 
Note that t' may be<=> 0. 
In order to prove that these first order conditions describe the optimal solution to the R&D 
problem illustrated in Figure 4.1 and in order to characterize the incentive compatible contract 
t(T), a series of lemmas and theorems follows: 
Lemma 4.4: As with full information, St Us - Un� 0 for all T.
Proof: see Appendix 
Theorem 4.4: µ > O; i.e., there is a moral hazard agency contracting concern. 
Proof: see Appendix 
Lemma 4.5: Given Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.4, t' > - � V T  [a sufficient condition tost 
characterize the solution of the agent's problem (4.8)].
Proof: see Appendix 
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4.8 
4.10 
4.11 
4.12 
4.13 
4.14 
For subcomponent R&D production under profit seeking agency (subsection 3.4) we were 
unable to show that the contract resulting from the first order conditions had the property that 
the agent was better off for each differential increase in the Research outcome. This failing 
prohibited the establishment of a theorem characterizing optimal subcomponent R&D 
contracting with a profit seeking agent. Under performance seeking agency we have proven 
Lemma 4.5 which establishes that the agent is better off for each differential increase in the 
Research outcome. This result plays a pivotal role in the theorems to follow as it is an overly 
strict sufficient condition for the agent's concerns. The Fundamental Management Postulate 
(FMP) allows us to assume that a sufficient condition for the principal's concerns is satisfied;
however, for ease of exposition we will assume that the FMP is strengthened and allows for a 
condition on the principal's problem analogous to Lemma 4.5.
Assumption 4.2: t' < U 
S� �5 
U 
for all T. [The principal is better off for each T]rr t S 
Theorem 4.5: Given Assumption 4.2, the solution {b*, i..*, t*(T)} derived from the first order 
necessary conditions to the principal's problem (4.9) is the unique optimum solution and results 
in positive research investment [i..* > O].
Proof: 
i. From (4.12) it is clear that Lemma 4.5 provides a sufficient condition for the agent's
optimization with respect to A.
ii. Assumption 4.2 is a sufficient condition for concavity with respect to A of the maximand
in the principal's optimization problem:
The second derivative of the maximand combined with Assumption 4.2 yields 
ii. The principal's side of (4.10) is quasi-concave, the agent's convex:
The maximum will occur in the interior. QED
Corollary 4.3: Assumption 4.2 and its role in Theorem 4.5 can be characterized by the relative 
risk aversion condition [Analogous to Corollary 4.1]:
v" > S.,.. v'St d ( f , ) 0 
-- __...._ + µ - ....LI.. + VT v' - STSt STUrr dT f sturr(urr - StUs) 
where 0 = SitUsUrr - StUs(StUsrr - Urrrr ) + Si:Drr(StUss - Usrr) s 0 VT.
Proof: Immediate with the same approach as Corollary 4.1. QED
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4.3 The Relevance of the an Observable Research Outcome 
Assume that -r is not observable. Instead after Research is concluded, the agent states an 
outcome, i = -r - E; the principal provides the transfer t( i ); and the agent produces S(T, t *).  In
addressing this interim adverse selection problem, the critical issue, as in subsection 3.5, is the 
enforcement of the final outcome. Definition of Enforcement: 
4.15 
By the implicit function theorem, we know that there exists a t * (e) and that
4.16 
We can characterize misrepresentation when T is not observable by maximizing the monetary 
gain from Development, referred to colloquially as skimming: 
£ = v[s( T ,  t* ( T - e) )] + TJ[ t * ( T - e) - t( T - E) ] + PE
d£ * * * [ ] de : - t ' v 'St - t ' TJ '  + t ' TJ '  = - p  = t' 11 ' - t ' v'St + 11 ' 
Substituting in the expression for t'* from the enforcement condition and rearranging:
t ' = - � [1 + i] + p
st v'St 
4.17 
Note that if p > 0, then E = 0, i = T, and the lack of an observable is irrelevant; no skimming takes
place. The condition on t'  for this follows directly from (4.17) : 
s [ 11 ' ] [ 11 ' ] t ' > -� 1 + 
v'S
t , where we set r = 1 + v 'St 
and note that r s 1 
From Lemma 4.5 we know that t ' > -f ; thus, r determines the relevance of the observable and 
t 
[ Marginal Disutility of Revealing T ] can be thought of as 1 + M . al U . 1. f R al" . Therefore, r represents an agent argm ti ity o eve mg T 
attribute that affects whether or not interim adverse selection binds. 
Theorem 4.6: When contracting with a performance seeking agent with a Research outcome 
unobserved by the principal, the candidate optimal contract from the first order conditions [4.10, 
4.11, and 4.13] is the optimal ICDR R&D contract if, for all Research outcomes, the agent's 
marginal utility from skimming Development funds, -11 ', is less than or equal to his marginal 
utility from pursuing subcomponent performance, v'� 
20 
4.18 
_ _ S Us 
Proof: Posit a candidate optimal t (T) such that Assumption 4.2 holds; i .e., t ' < U _ 5 U lT t s 
particular T. If t (T ) is such that at this same T condition ( 4.18) is satisfied, then we know that
at a 
11 ' By Lemma 4. 4 ( Urr - St Us � 0 ), we know that if - v'� < 1, then r
= T. From Theorem 4.5, we 
know that one possible optimum incentive compatible contract has the property that Assumption 
4.2 holds for all T; thus, as long as - 11'5' < 1 \;/ T for this optimum contract, then the agent will 
v t 
state the true outcome of Research, T, when T is unobservable. QED
Corollary 4.4: An optimal ICDR R&D contract that meets the requirements of Theorem 4.6 may 
be weakly negatively monotonic. 
Proof: Note that condition (4.18) is the lower bound on t' if no skimming is to occur. Theorem 4.6
requires -11 ' � v 'St for all T. Therefore, the maximum lower bound for t '  is t' = 0 for all T. QED
When the requirements for Theorem 4.6 do not hold for the candidate optimal ICDR R&D 
contract, then interim adverse selection may bind resulting in the agent under stating the 
Research outcome and skimming some percentage of Development funding. The principal's task 
of procuring all other subcomponents to the final good is facilitated by knowing the true 
Research outcome of subcomponent S, else expenditure on the other subcomponents will likely 
be suboptimal. Thus, a candidate optimal contract that is insufficiently steep over some range of 
possible Research outcomes must be modified so that the true outcome of Research is reported 
even if some skimming occurs. This is the adverse selection problem considered by Guesnerie and 
Laffont and can be similarly handled by modifying the candidate optimal contract with flat 
segments.10 Over these flattened segments the principal accepts monetary skimming in exchange 
for the accurate revelation of the Research outcome. In the extreme, the candidate optimal would 
be transformed into a Pure Fixed Price (PFP) contract, with a fixed sum transferred to the agent 
who is then allowed to retain whatever percentage he wishes and use the rest to pursue 
subcomponent performance. Note that only with a performance seeking agent would such an 
arrangement make any sense to the principal.
1�oger Guesnerie and Jean-Jacques Laffont, "A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent 
Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm," Journal of Public Economics, vol. 25, 
1985, pages 329-369. 
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5.0 PROCUREMENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The potential benefits of innovation motivate R&D efforts throughout the economy. Within 
the production organization of a complex final good, a principal exists who must manage the 
procurement and integration of the subcomponents that constitute the final good.  The agency 
implications of the heightened uncertainties that distinguish R&D from standard production 
should influence which subcomponents undergo R&D and what contractual forms are used. 
Through analyses of various agency and information structures, this research has characterized 
optimal R&D contracting, enabling significant insight into private and public sector procurement. 
Both principal and agent could benefit from contracts where subcomponent price and 
performance capability vary with the Research outcome - the principal by balancing the 
capabilities of all subcomponents so as to minimize unnecessary overall costs and the agent by 
sharing the cost exposure of the risky Research endeavor. Ideally, the principal and agent would 
agree to a specific Research investment and an explicit range of Development efforts contingent 
on the outcome of the Research. I have described the appropriate Real World analog of this ideal 
contract as a Cost Exposure Sharing (CES) contract. Only when agency effects prevent the 
existence of CES contracts would the principal's contracting preferences default to Fixed Price 
Performance Based (FPPB) or Pure Fixed Price (PPP) contracts. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of this research. Depending on agent motivation and the 
principal's knowledge of the Research outcome, the preferred CES contract may not be attainable. 
Most striking, if the principal cannot observe the Research outcome from a profit seeking agent, 
then a contract dependent on the Research outcome cannot be devised; requiring the use of a 
FPPB contract. The efficacy of profit seeking agency is brought into general question by the 
inability to show that R&D contracts 
acceptable to the principal would 
necessarily be acceptable to the agent. The 
implications of a limited choice set for 
R&D bodes ill for a principal whose 
performance seeking agents (e.g., internal 
divisions) may then seek additional rents. 
The following subsections examine 
how the interplay of observability and 
agency motivation affect private sector 
and public sector R&D procurement. Not 
surprisingly, the effects are different due 
to the disparate forces shaping each sector. 
Table 5.1. Optimal R&D Subcomponent Contracts for 
different Motivation and Information Mixes 
Profit 
Seeking 
Agent 
Motivation 
Type 
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Performanc 
Seeking 
E 
Principal's Knowledge of 
the Research Outcome 
Observable Unobservable 
CES* FPPB* 
Subsection 3.4 Theorem 3.3 
CES , '  I 
[preferred]./ 
CES 
, 
,,.)o, , 
���If:' PFP 
Theorem 4.5 , [default] ,, 
* R&D not assured, may revert to Off-the-Shelf 
--------· - - -- -- ---· 
5.1 PRIVATE SECTOR PROCUREMENT IM:PLICATIONS 
Product innovation is critical for a firm competing in a free market economy -- the threat of 
eclipse by existing or new competitors places a premium on cost efficient R&D.11 Thus, a firm's 
subcomponent R&D procurement plans should depend on the efficacy of the various agency 
choices available. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate theoretically consistent, hypothetical contracting 
options for subcomponent R&D contracted to a profit seeking agent. In Figure 5.1, the principal, 
by knowing the Research outcome, is able to balance the performance contribution of the 
subcomponent [i.e., S(T, p(T))] with its budget impact on all other concurrent subcomponent 
decisions [i.e., t(T) ] .  This concurrent balancing ability is lost when the Research outcome is 
unobservable and the contract must revert to a FPPB contract as in Figure 5.2. The expected price 
per unit performance from the FPPB contract of Figure 5.2 might be greater or less than that from 
the CES contract of Figure 5.1; however, it is clear that the value of certainty over concurrent 
subcomponent balancing is lost with the FPPB form. 
1 0  
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Dollars, 4 
Arbitrary 
Units 2 
0 
-2 
Resulting 
Subcomponent 
1 .2 Performance 
1 .1 
1 .0 1.3 1 .6 1 .9 
Research Outcome Net Compeil­
sation, t - p
1 .0  1 . 1  1 .2 1 . 3  1 .4 1 .5 1 .6 1 . 7  1 .8 1 .9 2 . 0  
Observable Research Outcome T(A, 8), 
,. 0 = 1 .0 is Off-the-Shelf, 'A = Research Investment 
Figure 5.1. CES Subcomponent R&D Contract 
with a Profit Seeking Agent 
1 0  
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
-2 
1 1 . 1  1 .2 1 . 3  1 .4 1 .5 
Subcomponent Performance, S = S(r, p(r)), 
,. not Observable, Off-the-Shelfperfonnance 50 = 1.0 
Figure 5 .2. FPPB Subcomponent R&D Contract 
with a Profit Seeking Agent 
The overall value loss to the principal from balance uncertainty can come from either the 
time value of waiting for subcomponent S to be fully produced or from the increased risks of 
finalizing all other subcomponent decisions based on an expected value for S. In either case, the 
loss from unobervability is as valid a justification as subcomponent price to entice the principal to 
utilize a performance seeking agent (e.g., an internal division of the principal's firm). Figure 5.3
provides a performance seeking alternative to the profit seeking contracts of Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
11 The relevance and effectiveness of market forces are implicit here in the terminology "cost efficient
R&D," as an R&D decision must be based on an expected value calculation made relative to the anticipated 
market demand for the innovated product. 
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Figure 5.3. CES Subcomponent R&D Contracts 
with a Performance Seeking Agent 
Research outcome is unobservable 
and his marginal utility of skimming
is high enough over some potential 
values of the Research outcome, then 
skimming becomes a potential second 
source of financial recompense and 
the CES contract must be modified 
with PFP segments to partially retain 
the desired balancing property. 
In deciding with what type of agent to contract, the principal must consider the combined 
expected impacts of subcomponent price and balancing capability. When the Research outcome 
is unobservable and the ability to concurrently balance decisions across subcomponents is very 
important, 12 the value to the principal of a performance seeking agent will be high. Without 
choice among performance seeking agents, an internal division of the principal's firm can exact a 
heightened rent (larger transfer b) . In such cases, the principal should be interested in 
stimulating external performance seeking agency. A number of recent R&D efforts, the principals 
of which are arguably subject to high balancing valuations, illustrate � mechanism that may 
effectively transform profit seekers into performance seekers: 
Much of the first $1 billion for the Iridium global cellular system, has been invested by 
the principal, Motorola, and critical R&D subcomponent suppliers. 
The approximately $5 billion required to produce the first 777 jet liner was provided by 
Boeing and a group of critical subcomponent suppliers who are guaranteed long-term 
supply contracts, the volume of which depends on the market success of the 777 . 
Having agents pay for the right to share in any returns from the final product may allow a 
principal to avoid the rents of an internal agent, and, thus, bring an innovated product to market 
at a more competitive price. Analysis of such a contract is beyond the model presented here as 
the agent's revenue becomes dependent on the final good as well as his subcomponent. 
12e.g., high potential returns to technology, long Development phases or the threat of rapid innovation 
by a competitor, and large overall expenditures to bring a product to market 
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5.2 PUBLIC SECTOR PROCUREMEN T  IM:PLICA TIO NS 
Agencies of the U.S. government regularly manage substantial R&D efforts.  Numerous next 
generation weapon systems and the national space exploration effort are examples of post-WWII 
publicly procured complex products that have required subcomponent R&D. The public sector 
principal who manages procurement and integration of the subcomponents should have a 
valuation over the final product that is essentially equivalent to the analogous private sector 
principal; namely, to balance the performance contribution of a single subcomponent against that 
subcomponent's budgetary impact on the other required subcomponents. What operationally 
distinguishes the public sector principal from the private is a vast internal set of agents 
interacting with a system of federal procurement regulations that discourages external R&D 
agency. A little history serves as an appropriate precursor for explaining this distinction. 
Prior to WWII, a standard U.S. government subcomponent R&D contract was the FPPB 
contract with profit seeking agents. For instance, innovations to the U.S. Army Air Corps 
(USAAC) fighting capability were procured by designating performance criteria for a desired 
plane and a willingness to purchase certain volumes of production at certain prices for planes 
that met or exceeded those criteria. Private firms raised the risk capital to perform the required 
R&D and then entered their prototypes in Fly-Off competitions, from which the USAAC decided 
which entrants should be procured at what volumes. At the outset of hostilities, the extent and 
p ace of R&D deemed necessary by the USAAC resulted in the almost uniform adoption of Cost­
Plus contacting, in which a firm received progress payments that covered all costs incurred in 
Research, Development, and subsequent production. Based on the eventual outcome of the R&D, 
the firm would receive an additional fee. This fee might be solely dependent on physical 
performance or it might depend on a number of parameters valued by the principal, such as date 
of delivery and / or final cost vs. bid price.13
The exigencies of WWII motivated an immense expansion of R&D efforts conducted within 
agencies of the government, best exemplified by the growth of National Laboratories, such as 
those that grew out of the Manhattan Project. During the Cold War, the National Laboratories 
became the principals in charge of designing, procuring, and, often, integrating the 
subcomponents to public R&D efforts. Substantial subcomponent R&D was contracted 
internally, to subdivisions of the National Laboratories, while the standard external R&D contract 
to profit seeking firms remained Cost-Plus in form. 
For a profit seeking agent, the Cost-Plus contract can be a special case of either the CES or 
the FPPB contract. In either case, the critical feature imposed by the Cost-Plus restriction is that 
13John B. Rae, Climb to Greatness: The American Aircraft Industry, 1920-1960, The MIT Press, 1968, pages
77,78, 96, and 121. 
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the firm's costs must not exceed the price paid by the principal.  With reference to Figure 5.1, this
is equivalent to the statement that net compensation must be non-negative over all potential 
Research outcomes. The following simple and reasonable example illustrates the impact of a 
non-negative profit restriction on a profit seeking agent's R&D decisions: 
. . {probability of successful Research outcome r = 1 - p Given a 2-state R&D environment probability of unsuccessful Research outcome T0 = P
and assuming that the Research outcome is observable, the goal is to determine and 
employ a CES contract {A.*, p*(T}, t*(T}} such that an optimal R&D effort is undertaken. 
Assumption 5 .1: The Development cost for the profit seeking agent if the Research 
outcome is unsuccessful is at least as large as the Off-the-Shelf price; namely, p(T0) � Ps0•
Recalling the profit seeking agent's utility function, V = v(t - p) - t.p{ A.) , the 
following inequality must hold if any Research effort (A. > O} is to be undertaken 
Applying Assumption 5.1 to condition (5.1) yields two additional inequalities
v( t(T0 ) - p(T0 )) � v(t(T0 ) - P 5J < v(t (r) - p(r)) , 
which directly imply that the profit from a successful Research outcome must 
increasingly exceed the Off-the-Shelf profit with increasing Research risk, p, if any 
Research effort is to be undertaken. In this regard, the non-negative profit restriction of 
any Cost-Plus contracting structure implies that the profit for a successful Research 
outcome must become quite high as the Research risk of failure increases. Conditions 
(5.1) and (5.2} indicate that the impact of requiring Cost-Plus contracting for R&D
procurements from profit seekers can only raise the price of external procurement, 
favoring internally conducted R&D. 
5.1 
5 .2 
The preceding example illustrates how restricting external procurements to Cost-Plus 
contracts should bias Federal Laboratories toward internal R&D subcomponent procurement. 
The application of one Federal Acquisition Regulation enshrines this bias for all high risk, avant­
garde R&D -- Profit margins under Cost-Plus contracts are restricted by law to be no greater than 
15%.14 Thus, the government, having granted a Federal Laboratory the position of principal, so
restricts the principal's contracting options that the principal may justly reserve the most 
technologically engaging R&D tasks for his internal agents. The internal agents support the 
status quo contracting practices as they are allowed to extract substantial rents. Further, the 
Federal Laboratories have traditionally operated as monopolies over subsets of publicly funded 
R&D; thus, the principals are in agreement with their internal agents on maintaining a 
contracting structure that justifies institutionalized innovation; surely an oxymoron. 
14Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 15, Section 15, 903, Paragraph Dl.
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APPENDIX A: EX AN1E CO:MPLE1E VS INCOMPLE1E CON1RAC1S 
Within the context of the principals and agents considered by this research, I contend that it 
is appropriate to consider only complete contracting as the justifications for efficient incomplete 
contracts either do not apply or are irrelevant: 
Tirole suggests that renegotiation between production stages may be justified by the 
principal not knowing his values ex ante for outcomes of agent investment -- perhaps 
because of the impacts of concurrent procurements.15 My analysis internalizes the
impacts of concurrent procurements with the proxy of R&D-residual funds for other 
subcomponent procurements. The principal is ex ante aware of the tradeoffs between 
subcomponents even though he is not aware of the specific trades he will make. 
Ching-To Albert Ma has shown that renegotiation based on concerns of the agent may 
be an irrelevant complication -- the optimal contract remains the ex ante complete 
contract.16
Crocker and Reynolds posit that incomplete contracts may result from an intermediate 
principal's unwillingness to commit the effort to arrange complete contracts.17 Our
research has concentrated on the level of principal responsible for integrating a final 
good for which he gamers immediate monetary or property right value. Such a 
principal is motivated to pursue efficiency and should not be as eager to accept an 
agent's incomplete contract offer as is Crocker's and Reynold's intermediate principal. 
l5Jean Tirole, "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 2, 1986, pages
235-259. . 
16Ching-To Albert Ma, "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts, " The Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 61(1), no. 206, January 1994, pages 109-129. 
17Keith J. Crocker and Kenneth J. Reynolds, "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical 
Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, " RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 24, no. 1, Spring 1993, pages 
126-146. 
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APPENDIX B: MA 1HEMA TICAL APPENDIX 
s 
Lemma 4.2: The optimal contract under complete information has the property that t '  > - .....!. \;;/ T .
Proof: From (4.6): 
STX + A t I = - ------
S 1 X + B '
f X = S1 (v'(S1U00 - US1r ) - v" (S1U8 - U,, )) < 0
where � A = v 'SrtU,, > 0 
lB = v ' [S11U,, - S1 (S1US7r - U,.,, )) < 0
ST > - -s . 
I 
QED
Lemma 4.3: The contract under complete information has the property that t' � - STt 'r/ T . sit 
Proof: 
ry = S,51 [v'(S1U00 - US1r )  - v" (S1Us - U,, )) < 0 
where 1c = s;(v ' (Sp00 - US7r )  - v"(S1U9 -U,, )) - v'S 1 (S1US7r -U,.,, ) < 0 
y 
t ' = - ...,,.----..--c + v'511U,, 
Corollary 4.1: H the relative risk aversion condition - � � ;� + S U (u !l _ S U ) 'r/r holds, whereT I I 7r 7r I S 
n = S1iUsU,, - S1Us (S1US7r -u,.,, ) +S 1U,, (S1Uoo - US7r ) � o  'r/r I then Assumption 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 hold: 
Proof: Follows directly by establishing the condition on t'  such that the principal would be no better off 
with each increasing revelation in the observable T. 
Set this as the maximum t' allowed relative to the candidate solution (4.6): 
Rearranging terms and separating out all v' and v" terms yields:
Cancellation and rearrangement lead to the desired result: 
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v" Srt !l � -s -s + -S-U-(U---
-s-u-) 'r/r QED V T I I 7r 7r I S 
Corollary 4.2 : H Uss, Umr, U srr, and v" = 0 [Tan's Assumptions], then
i. 
ii. 
iii. Assumption 4.1 holds, implying that Theorem 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 hold.
Proof: 
i. immediate from (4.6) {maximum slope by Lemma 4.3}
ii. d / dr[Urr - S1Psl = e [2sp97r - u,,,, - Si1Us - s;1Us,s l + ST U5,, - Srt Us - STS t Us.s = 0
iii. immediate from (ii) and Lemma 4.1. QED
Theorem 4.3: Any positive R&D result (/.. > 0) from the full information first order conditions (4.3, 4.4, and
4.5) implies that both principal and agent are better off in expectation. 
Proof: 
That the agent is better off over all T is provided by Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.2
That the principal is better off for any /.. > 0 is shown through examination of condition (4.4).
Recall (4.4): g� :  I UfA dr + v [J vfAdT + ri '] + p = 0
For /.. > 0, p = 0 and the participation constraint (4.1) holds; therefore y > 0. 
Now define the Marginal R&D case (1-fil.&D) as the solution to conditions (4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) that results in 
Ju[ s(T, t( T) ), B - b - t(T)jf(T, J.. )dr = u(so , B - Ps. ) 
:. Jut;,dT I = o � [JvtAdr + ri 'JI = o MR&D MR&D 
Now examine the nature of MR&D for a differential increase in /..: 
Therefore , from .( 4.4), Juf".dT > 0 for,R&D efforts above MR& D
Now assume that at MR&D the principal opts for U0 rather than for E[U]; therefore, 
which implies that the principal is better off in expectation for all R&D undertaken. QED 
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Lemma 4.4: In the incomplete information case, as with complete information, StUs - Urr � 0 for all r. 
Proof: Define If as the space of (S, II) pairs on which the principal's utility may be assessed. Also define (
as a candidate for the optimal contract from the first order conditions. For any true t", we know that 
i. 
ii. 
f; < = > 0 depending on r
iii. : . Si Us - U rr < 0 for some r regardless of µ <=> 0.
The proof proceeds by contradiction: 
Assume that given t", for some r, StUs - Urr > 0. Then from (iii) there is a point B in If where StDs - Urr = 0.
Further, characterize (by the intervals in If around B 
over [A, B] t " ( r) s. t. StUs - U,, � 0
over (B, C] t " (r ) s.t. SiUs - U,, > 0 
. • •  
= 
{t" over [ A, BJ 
Now cons1der t - c u  _ U = 0 ( B CJ  s. t. vi s " over , 
Over (B, C] note that both principal and agent are better off with t- then with t"; therefore, t" cannot be the
optimal solution. This is a contradiction, and thus 
Theorem 4.4: µ > O; i.e., there is a moral hazard agency contracting concern. 
Proof: Assume the contrary; i.e., µ � 0. Denote by t (r ) the transfer required under the optimum risk
sharing condition (4.5) to result in the incomplete information participation shadow price defined by 
I StUs - U,, f7' 1 
y = - L st v' + µ T J v T 
for r E {rlf7' (r, A )  ) 0) 
l stU5 - U,, 1 < _ ls;fJ5 - U,, 1 - L st v' J - v = l st v' J 
rt(r ) � t (r) 
=> �TI:  � 1T 
ls � s 
for T E {rlf7' ( T, A ) < 0) 
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--------- - ---
ft (T ) S t (T )  
=- { rr � n 
ls s s 
ft(T) = t(T) 
=- { rr = n 
ls = s 
Combining these results with Lemma 4.1, we have 
Integrating by parts 
f 
� 
f I dU l Theorem 43 Uf1. dT = - F" lTrtT > 0 
: . f Uf1. dr > 0
This implies, by the assumption that the agent's problem has an interior solution (4.11), that the coefficient of 
µ must be negative; thus requiring µ > 0. This is a contradiction.
:. µ > 0. QED
Lemma 4.5: Given Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.4, t' > - ST 'r/ T [a sufficient condition for (4.8) tos t 
characterize the solution of the agent's problem] 
Proof: Recall the expression for t'  under incomplete information (4.14) 
STSi [v '( S1Us.s -USrr ) - v ' (S 1Us - U,, )j + v 'ST1U,, + µ (v 'S1 f �(�) 
t '  = - s; [v (S 1Us.s -U97t ) - v"(S1U5 -U,,,)J - v'S 1 ( S1USrr -U"" )  + v'SuU" 
This can be rewritten as 
fX = S1 [ v '(S1Us.s - U57t ) - v"(S1U5 - U" )j < 0
where � A = v 'STtU" + µ(v 'S1 f ! ( f; ) > 0
lB = v ' [SuU" - Si (S 1USrr - U"" )) < 0
> - ST 'r;/ T QEDs t . 
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